Wayne Smith, "Journal of Latin American Studies; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK) and New York (USA), Volume 37 " , May 2005 :

„In this sensitive, extraordinarily well-written and researched account, Volker Skierka takes us from Fidel Castro’s childhood and early days as a revolutionary to the present day. It is a fascinating journey. Who would have imagined when Castro landed with his ragtag band in Oriente province in December of 1956 to begin his guerrilla struggle against the Batista dictatorship that he would not only win but still be on the world stage almost half a century later, even though he had to stand up to the worst the United States, the most powerful nation in the world, could throw at him? Against all odds, he has faced and won out against ten US presidents. Not only that, he has survived the collapse of the Soviet Union itself and, indeed, the world communist system as a whole. The Comintern and the Warsaw Pact have disappeared, but Fidel Castro and his version of socialism are still standing.
Essentially, as Skierka points out, it is Castro’s successful defiance of the United States that is at the core of his myth. And it is the virtually unrelenting and futile US effort to bring him down which has assured continued life to the myth. Certainly, it is this that explains his strong and enduring popularity in Latin America. It is not that Argentines, Brazilians or Mexicans wish to adopt the Cuban system. They see its shortcomings. But whenever Castro visits a Latin American capital, as in Buenos Aires in May 2002 for the inauguration of President Néstor Kirchner, he is greeted by enthusiastic thousands. They cheer him not so much for what he has done in Cuba, but for standing up to the United States, something they wish their own governments could do more often and openly.
Skierka’s account of the supposed confrontation between Fidel and Che Guevara upon the latter’s return in March 1965 from a trip through Africa is the most thorough I’ve seen and makes fascinating reading. While in Africa, Guevara had scathingly criticised the Soviets, saying, in effect, that they were little better than the imperialists in their treatment of the developing countries. It stands to reason that Castro would have been pressured by the Soviets to discipline his wayward companion. But this came in the midst of deep disagreements between Castro himself and the Soviets, largely over whether or not to pursue armed struggle, i.e., guerrilla warfare, in the developing world, or the popular front tactics preferred by Moscow, largely a matter of trying to win over more converts to the orthodox communist parties and play for eventual victory (even if that retreated into the distant future).
I was on the Cuban Desk in the Department of State at the time and we watched expectantly to see what Castro would do. Would he applaud or reprimand? He met Guevara at the airport, an event covered fully by the Cuban press, but Guevara was then never again seen in public. He, in effect, went on to other revolutions and other lands.
But did this mean a sharp disagreement – or break – between Castro and Guevara? Skierka quotes sources within the inner circle as saying that Castro ‘energetically reprimanded’ Guevara for indiscipline, that is, for saying nasty things about the Soviets without authorisation.
Perhaps, but let us remember that every nasty word about the Soviets uttered by Guevara in Africa had been fully reported by the Cuban press, and this would not have happened without Castro’s approval. Certainly Castro did not change his own tactics, even though they clashed sharply with Moscow’s. He continued to call for armed struggle, as had Guevara.
A year later, at the Tri-Continental Conference held in Havana in January of 1966, as Skierka tells us, Castro emphasised anew the need for armed struggle and heaped scorn on the orthodox parties, and by inference, the Soviet Union, for not pursuing it.
This Cuban–Soviet conflict came to a head finally over the so-called ‘Prague Spring’ in Czechoslovakia, where Dubcek was trying to assert a certain independence for the Czech Communist Party. That was directly in line with Castro’s own position, and he fully supported Dubcek. But the outcome was inevitable. Moscow might tolerate disagreements over tactics in the developing countries. It would not tolerate a challenge to the leadership of the CPSU. On August 21 of 1968, it invaded Czechoslovakia.
Skierka gives us a good account of the Cuba reaction. I would quibble, however, with his assertion that this offered Castro ‘an unexpected and spectacular opportunity to return to the Moscow fold’.
In fact, Castro had little choice. He had supported the right of the Czech Party to assert independence, and Cuba initially deplored the invasion. Saul Landau, the well-known documentary filmmaker and Cuba expert, was in Havana at that point at saw placards that had been prepared for Castro’s speech – placards which denounced the Soviet invasion.
But clearly, Soviet patience had run out. Skierka reports a conversation between the Soviet and East German ambassadors in Havana in which the former raises the possibility that Soviet aid to Cuba will not continue. Obviously, that message was delivered to Castro as well. And so, when he gave his speech on 23 August, he deplored the need for the invasion but ended up saying it was necessary, given the efforts of the imperialists to take advantage of the situation in Czechoslovakia. From that point forward, Cuba–Soviet relations entered their most harmonious period – until the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.
Perhaps Skierka’s most valuable contribution is his careful and unemotional assessment of Castro the man and leader, and his predictions regarding Cuba’s future in the post-Castro era.
On the first count, he sees Castro as a man dedicated to egalitarian principles who has done much good for his country in terms of education and health care for all and a greater equality, though given the economic problems of the post-Soviet period, life may be grim. But he also sees him as authoritarian to the core, a man who has little use for either a free press or free expression. Castro is convinced that he knows the correct path to nirvana and so is not much interested in the views of the man in the street.
On the second, Skierka expects Castro to die with his boots on, not to be overthrown. As Skierka points out, the internal opposition is in fact quite weak and is not likely to become less so. And when Castro passes from the scene, Skierka would expect something of a collective leadership, officials drawn from within the present system, to take over. The exiles in Miami will have little if anything to do with the outcome. I would fully agree with that, only adding that if the new leadership wants to retain the support of the Cuban people, it will have to move ahead rapidly toward economic reforms. Castro may have the moral authority to hold out against change, but no one else would. And the Cuban people do want change, and a higher standard of living.
One thing is certain, as Skierka says, Castro ‘will go down in history as one of the few revolutionaries who remained true to his principles’.“